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Abstract 
Although Russia’s WTO-accession is foreseeable, there are still deficits in the 
literature on its concrete effects on the sectoral and regional levels. In this paper 
we analyse effects on Russia’s chemical and petrochemical sectors (CPS), 
which are, unlike for example its oil and mineral gas industry, rarely in the fo-
cus of public attention. On the basis of an extensive examination of these sec-
tors’ current condition, we expect serious problems for them to emerge in the 
nearer future, the perhaps most serious and most puzzling problem being under-
investment. Our analysis is based on data provided by GOSKOM-
STAT/ROSSTAT, Russia’s official statistics institute. 
 
The authors like to thank Henning P. Jørgensen for valuable comments on an ear-
lier version of the paper. 
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1.  Introduction 
Russia’s WTO accession is a widely dicussed topic, especially in the country it-
self (Petrov 2002: 16). Although there are some analyses on the accession’s ag-
gregate regional or sectoral impacts (Ustenko 2002; Yudayeva et al. 2003; Jen-
sen, Rutherford &Tarr 2004a, 2004b), there is so far still a deficit in the litera-
ture on its concrete impacts on the transformation of different sectors, dealing 
with a sector’s actual economic constition at the advent of WTO accession.  
 
In this paper, we present such a sector-focused in-depth analysis. We examine 
Russia’s chemical and petrochemical sector (CPS),
1 especially with respect to 
economic agents’ investment behaviour, competition and innovative activities. 
As this sector is of significant importance in certain regions of Russia, we will 
also elaborate on some regional impacts of changes of economic performance 
that have to be expected for the future – not only as an effect of the WTO-
accession itself, but as a result of intensifying international competition in gen-
eral. While we do not completely agree with Salichow (2002: 5), who expects 
‘serious problems’ for some regions in Russia after WTO-accession, we never-
theless expect challenges for many firms in Russia’s CPS as a result of the 
country’s world market integration. As the CPS is regionally clustered in Rus-
sia, regions will be affected asymmetrically by this. 
 
We analyse the economic condition of Russia’s CPS at the advent of the WTO-
accession and compare it to other leading sectors of the Russian economy. In 
the third section we present some results of a little empirical investigation we 
                                                            
1   The term “chemical and petrochemical sector” (CPS) has been used by Russian classification (OK-
ONH / Obshesojuzny Klassifikator Otraslei Narodnogo Hosjastwa) until 2005. According to 
Postanovlenie GOSSTANDARTA Rossii ot 06.11.2001 №454-СT, OKONH was transformed to 
OKWED (Obtscherossiky Klassifikator Widow Ekonomitscheskoi Dejatelnosti) after then. There-
fore, all data from 2005 follows the OKWED definition of CPS, consisting of the industries chemical 
production, production of vulcanized rubber and plastic commodities as well as manufacturing of 
coke and oil commodities. Exceptions are seperately explained in the respective tables.  
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carried out among some of Russia’s leading firms in the sector. Our analysis is 
mostly based on data provided by GOSKOMSTAT/ROSSTAT, Russia’s offi-
cial statistics institute. 
 
According to information provided by the World Bank (World Bank 2004; 
World Bank 2005), Russia’s CPS recently experienced a remarkable reduction 
of growth which has almost collapsed during 2004 and the beginning of 2005 
(table 1). We find that Russia’s CPS suffers from severe under-investment and 
is rather ill-prepared for a more intense integration into the world markets. 
Ironically, the difficulties the industry currently faces are almost entirely 
‘home-made’ and can only in part be attributed to intensified international 
competition, which of course tends to reveal and expose the weaknesses. Ex-
plaining the behaviour of Russian firms that failed to invest in times when prof-
its and growth rates were high is, however, quite a difficult task. 
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Table 1.  Growth of Selected Russian Industries, Compared to Period of 
Previous Year 




2007  6 Month 2008 
Non-ferrous metals  4.1  0.5  -  - 
Machinery, thereof:  13.6  5.1  12.0  -23.9 
Automobiles 13.8  7.1 - - 
Chemistry 9.0  2.3  4.8  12.7 
Fuels, energy; thereof:  8.0  5.9  30.0**  15.0** 
Oil extraction  9.5  7.7  4.4*  19.2* 
Gas 4.7  -2.0  -  - 
Building materials  7.7  3.1  -  - 
Electricity 0.6  -1.6  -  - 
* data covers coke and oil extraction,  
** data covers eletricity, gas and water industries,  
- no data available.  
Source: World Bank: Russian Economic Report No. 8, November 2004; Russian Economic Report 
No 17., November 2008 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRUSSIANFEDERATION/Resources/rer17_eng.pdf. 
2.  Russia’s CPS and the World Economy 
Russia’s CPS is imperfectly protected against foreign competitors by import 
tariffs. Weighted import tariffs in the CPS are around 10 per cent and cannot be 
characterised as being prohibitive (table 2). Compared to changes in real ex-
change rates, effects of import tariffs appear to be rather insignificant.
2 
 
                                                            
2   For effects of free trade between Russia and the EU see e.g. Sulamaa & Widgrén (2005); for trade ef-
fects of the EU-enlargement, Russia’s WTO-accession and the Russia-EU Free Trade Agreement see 
e.g. Vinhas de Souza (2004).  
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Table 2.  Import Tariffs for Selected Products of Russia’s CPS  







1. Sulphur  25  6.92  5 
2. Fertilizer (Nitrogen), tons  31  10  10 
3. Fertilizer (Potassium), tons  31  10  10 
4. Chemical means of plant protection 
(insecticides, herbicides, fungicides), tons 
38 5.83  5 
5. Synthetic detergents, tons  34  12.4  15 
6. Acyclic alcohol, tons  29  5.25  5 
7. Tyres for trucks, pieces  4011 20  9.10  15 
8. Car tyres, pieces  4011 20  9.10  15 
9. Photo- and kinogoods  37    from 5 to 20 
- Film with breadth 35 mm and more 
(exposed and developed, with or without 
sound track or only with sound track); 
3706 10  9.70  20 
- Photochemicals  3707  9.70  10 
Source: Narodnochosjastwennye posledstwija prisoedinenja Rossii k WTO (Economic effects of 
Russia’s WTO-Accession), Moscow 2002, Nacionalny Investicionny Soviet (National Investment 
Council), 96-99; O Tamoshennom Tarife RF I towarnoi nomenclature, primenjaenoi pri osut-
schestwlenii wneschneekonomitschekoi dezatelnosti, Postanowlenie Prawitelstwa Rossiqskoi Fede-
racii ot 27.11.2006 №718, Moskwa. 
 
Consequently, the Russian Academy of Sciences does not expect drastic turbu-
lences for the domestic industries subsequent to the country’s WTO accession if 
the country should be obliged to further cuts of its import tariffs.
3 More than 
that, a reduction of export tariffs, even in the context of the accession, seems to 
be rather unlikely at present. The negotiation parties currently seem to regard it 
as a progress that Russia appears to refrain from its so-called first-choice-
scenario which stipulated even transitory increases of transport tariffs for cer-
                                                            
3   According to an independent expert group, no serious system turbulances are to be expected as a con-
sequence of Russia’s WTO accession. Exceptions are individual companies that are not competitive 
as of now, however, they do have a significant impact on overall as well as sectoral growth. In the 
long-run, a positive influence on economic growth is unanimously expected (Minekonomraswitija 
Rossii (Russian Ministry of Economic Development) (December 2008; 
http://www.wto.ru/russia.asp?f=dela&t=11//)).   
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tain sectors after the accession, with the intention to more intensely protect do-
mestic producers against world market competition for some years to come. At 
the moment it is more likely that there will be a tariff binding more or less at 
current, non-prohibitive tariff levels. Effective import tariffs will, however, 
slightly increase due to reduced misclassifications after the introduction of a 
simplified and more transparent tariff structure  in 2001 (Chowdhury 2003; 
Afontsev 2004; Wojtynak & Broll 2008). Yet, there are still several ineffective 
procedures and institutions in the customs and transport system, like intranspar-
ent certification procedures, unsatisfactory protection of private property and 
contract enforcement, corruption, administrative barriers, and an inefficient 
government bureaucracy that let international investors refrain from the Russian 
market (Stern 2002). Nevertheless, one must expect that Russia’s WTO-
accession will intensify competition – not just because of tariffs probably being 
cut in the long term, but especially because of the Russian government’s obliga-
tion to improve contract and law enforcement and to reduce discrimination be-
tween foreign and domestic producers. In this context, dismantling barriers to 
market entry for providers of business services (insurance, banking, etc.) will 
most likely induce more remarkable effects on productivity and output of the 
Russian CPS than changes of import tariffs (Jensen, Rutherford & Tarr 2004a, 
2004b). Another driving force for structural changes will probably be the in-
creasingly sophisticated demand by Russian downstream producers and con-
sumers which at present can only in part be met by domestic suppliers. Conse-
quently, observers could witness an increase in imports of CPS products for the 
years to come and a significant increase of CPS-products’ relative importance 
in the import structure of the Russian economy.  
 
Exporting roughly one third of its production, the CPS is one of the sectors of 
the Russian economy that will be most strongly exposed to international com-
petition after WTO-accession. Among the documents being most widely dis-
cussed in the context of Russia’s WTO-accession is Narodnochosjastwennye 
posledstwija prisoedinenija Rossii k WTO (Economic consequences of Russia’s 
WTO-accession) which was published by the National Investment Council  
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(Nacionalny Investicionny Soviet 2002). The document describes two different 
paths of the accession, called the realistic and the optimal one. In both scenar-
ios, the council concludes that the WTO-accession will not cause serious dam-
ages to the Russian economy (Nacionalny Investicionny Soviet 2002: 17). Yet, 
not surprisingly, there are many different opinions to be found in the literature 
which can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Some authors maintain that the sector of raw materials and fuels, account-
ing for almost two thirds of Russia’s exports, will not suffer seriously 
from its more extensive integration in the world economy (Nacionalny 
Investicionny Soviet 2002: 8; Wojtynak & Broll 2008).
  
2. Regarding the CPS, some authors expect serious problems, especially be-
cause of the ‘lasting under-utilisation of production capacities’
 (Nacion-
alny Investicionny Soviet 2002: 9) as well as a better accessability of the 
Russian market for oil- and engeneering-related commodities and services 
which will put competitive pressure on the (comparable inefficient?) do-
mestic companies in this segment (Galiev & Havkin 2008). 
3. The Investment Council identifies regions that are characterised by ag-
glomerations of specific industrial sectors and are consequently closely 
tied to these sectors’ destiny. Regarding CPS, these regions are Nishe-
gorodskaja Oblast/Region, Republic of Tatarstan and Permskaja 
Oblast/Region. 
4. Kucobin and Glasjev (2002: 34) conclude that “[i]n sum, for the crisis-
shaken Russian economy the consequences of the accession will be nega-
tive in the short and mid-term”. In the long run, given a stable and sus-
tained growth, the authors expect positive global effects of an opening of 
the country’s internal markets and a growing FDI inflow (Lissowolik & 
Lissowolik 2004). 
5. While some Russian scholars emphasise that the effects of the WTO-
accession will remain moderate due to many sectors’ limited integration 
in the world economy, they do not fail to recognise the fact that the Rus-
sian economy is bound to follow the general tendency of open economies  
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to gain in sectors which are comparatively efficient and to lose in those 
being comparatively inefficient (Kucobin & Glasjev 2002: 31, 35). As a 
consequence, they predict a ‘sharp, dramatic character’ of structural 
changes that will be induced by the accession (Kucobin & Glasjev 2002: 
31). 
6. Recent model-based investigations expect mostly positive effects in the 
mid term. While Yudayeva et al. (2003) predict rather insignificant effects 
of tariff reductions, they expect productivity increases in Russia’s CPS 
and small output reductions in some Russian regions. Rutherford, Jensen 
and Tarr (2004a, 2004b) as well as Tarr (2007) emphasize strong positive 
effects of a liberalisation of business services amounting to roughly two 
thirds of total positive effects of WTO-accession which, in their model, 
will sum up to some 7.7 per cent increases of Russian consumption com-
pared to the non-accession scenario in the mid-term. 
 
Negotiations on Russia’s WTO-accession have lasted for more than fifteen 
years now, the relevant documents having been submitted by the Russian gov-
ernment as early as in 1993. In 1995, there was a first meeting of the working 
party which was in charge of Russia’s accession. This meeting was followed by 
another 18 sessions. Between 2001 and 2008 more than 380 meetings and con-
ferences took place in all Russian regions in order to discuss and prepare the 
WTO-accession problems, in particular export promotion and the access of for-
eign markets for Russian commodities. However, from today’s point of view it 
cannot be predicted when Russia’s accession to the WTO will be completed – 
with the upcoming tariff union among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (sched-
uled to start on the 1
st of July in 2010 with a common tariff codex) being an-
other influential factor.  
 
Opponents of the accession are mainly to be found within sectors that are not 
export-oriented and focused on the interior market. The main arguments against 
accession are not particularly inventive and well known from other discussions 
concerning the opening of an economy. First of all, it is argued that after the ac- 
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cession Russia will lose its leading position as a supplier of raw materials and 
fuels. The reason is that Russian firms are expected to be not sufficiently com-
petitive anymore in international markets once the country has entered the 
WTO. Very often the argument is stressed that, once having joined the WTO, 
Russia will be unable to carry out an independent industrial policy. Instead, for 
the sake of national security it is held to be advisable to strive for protection of 
domestic industries against foreign influence and to fuel growth of key sectors 
with resources of the domestic government (Department of Science and Indus-
trial Policy of the City of Moscow 2007).  
 
Other authors indirectly assert that the threat of international competition in the 
current situation is rather insignificant because domestic CPS can rely on low 
production costs, especially for energy and transport and that these industries 
are consequently rather threatened by rising energy and transport prices. Thus, 
according to these authors, the Russian CPS is competitive on international 
markets mainly because of its low input and transport prices – and not because 
of its protection against international competitors (inter alia Beljanin 2002: 24). 
However, this does not seem to constitute a very convincing argument in the 
face of (i) low productivity levels in the domestic CPS, (ii) the importance of 
product innovations in these industries and (iii) provided that in many CPS-
segments transport costs amount to only an insignificant share of total produc-
tion costs. Furthermore, an investigation by Gaidar (2002: 223) has shown that 
while for the Russian industry as a whole international competition is becoming 
increasingly prevalent, domestic competition is of even greater importance for 
Russia’s CPS than international competition.  
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3.  The Condition of Russia’s CPS since 1995 
A. General  Economic  Situation 
The CPS is one of Russia’s traditional sectors. In the late Soviet period the sec-
tor stagnated when there were hardly any new companies founded. However, 
during the following period the number of company establishments began to 
rise again. Other key sectors of the Russian economy, namely fuel industry and 
machinery construction, developed accordingly (Achmetov 2002: 9). Nowadays, 
the CPS is far from being Russia’s most important sector. Russia’s economy is 
dominated by machinery construction and metal processing (21.1 per cent of 
the entire industrial production in 2003, in prices of 1999), fuel industry (16.9 
per cent), food industry (15.6 per cent), non-ferrous metallurgy (10.5 per cent), 
electricity (8.1 per cnt), and black metallurgy (8.3 per cent). The CPS held a 
stable 7th position among Russia’s leading industries between 1992 and 2003 
(7.1 per cent in current prices; GOSKOMSTAT 2004a: 184). Since then, CPS’ 
position has only slightly improved with 2007 showing the following picture:
4 
energy & resources industries ca. 45 per cent of shipped goods from domestic 
production including related services, metallurgy ca. 11 per cent, food industry 
9 per cent, CPS about 9 per cent.
5  
 
The limited importance (and the technological behindness) of Russia’s CPS 
surprises if one keeps in mind Russia’s enormous natural petroleum resources. 
Attempts have been made to strengthen the sector. For instance, 2005 the Rus-
sian Government adopted the Conception for the Development of the Chemical 
and Petrochemical Industry until 2010 (http://rcc1.ru/Rus/LegalServices 2004), 
which was drawn up by the Russian Ministry for Science and Technology, as 
well as a related implementation plan. Currently, the experts from Min-
promenergo (the Ministry for Energy Production) develop a concept for the de-
                                                            
4   Own calculations following ROSSTAT (2008a: 198-199). 
5   The comparison is aggravated by changes in Russian statistics, cf. GOSKOMSTAT (2004a: 184) 
with ROSSTAT (2008a: 198-199).  
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velopment of Russia’s CPS until 2015.
6 Russia’s CPS is regionally agglomer-
ated in Privolshsky Federalny Okrug/District (11.8 per cent of the sector’s total 
production), Jushny Federalny Okrug/District (7.7 per cent), and Centralny 
Federalny Okrug/District (6.9 per cent) (GOSKOMSTAT 2003b: 344). Accord-
ing to the Expert-200-ranking, the biggest companies on the territory of the 
Russian Federation are located in the following regions: Republic of Tatarstan, 
Samarskaja Oblast/Province, and Republic of Bashkortostan. All these regions 
belong to the Privolshsky Federalny Okrug/District. In 2007 35.3 per cent of 
Privolshsky Federalny Okrug’s/District total production belonged to CPS, the 
figures for  Centralny Federalny Okrug/District and Jushny Federalny 
Okrug/District are 27.3 per cent and 24 per cent respectively.
7 
 
In the following we compare Russia’s CPS and its preparedness for WTO-
accession with that of two other leading sectors, namely fuel industry and ma-
chine construction/metal processing. The regions Republic of Tatarstan, Repub-
lic of Bashkortostan, and Samarskaja Oblast/Region will be scrutinised with 
specific attention. 
 
                                                            
6   See http://www.minprom.gov.ru/expertise/meeting/archive/29. 
7   Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian official statistical yearbook), Rosstat, Moscow, 2009, 
372-375.  
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Table 3.  Industrial Production of Leading Sectors  
  1995 1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2007 
Industry total  96.7  95.5  102.0 94.8  111.0 111.9  104.9  103.7  107.0  106.3* 




90.9 95.4  103.6 91.4 117.4 119.9  107.1  101.9  109.2  119.1** 
Chemistry and 
petrochemistry 
107.6 92.9 103.7 94.3  123.5 114.9  104.9  100.7  104.6 106.0***
* index including extraction of natural resources, manufacturing industries, energy, gas and water 
production and distribution (Rossija w cifrach. 2008, Rosstat, 200);  
**only machines and constructions; 
*** only chemistry. 
Source: Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian official statistical yearbook), GOSKOMSTAT, 
Moscow, 2004, 359; Rossija w cifrach. 2008, Rosstat, 2008, 200-202. 
 
Table 3 shows that, except for the years 1996, 1998 and 2002, Russia’s CPS 
performed better than the industry as a whole. In relative terms, the CPS even 
outperformed the fuel industry (in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2007). After 
having experienced a period of severe downturn after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russia’s CPS has entered a phase of moderate recovery in the aftermath 
of the economic crisis of 1998, albeit in many segments starting from a low 
level. This is indicated in the following table which shows growth rates of pro-
duction quantities for several products of Russia’s CPI in the periods 1990-
1998 and 1998-2001. 
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Table 4.   Output Quantities of Russia’s CPS, Selected Products, periods 
1990-1998 and 2000-2007, changes in per cent 
Production of basic kinds of products of CPS 










12.8 5.8 -7  8.3 9.7 1.4  -3.1 
% 100  45.3  -54.7%  64.8 75.8 11 -24.2% 
2. Soda ash 100% 
(without potash)  
Thsd. 
tones   
3240 1538  -1702  2201 2939 738  -301 
% 100  47.5  -52.5%  68 91 23 -9% 
3. Caustic soda 
100% 
Thsd. 
tones   
2258 847 -1411  1241 1297 56  -961 
% 100  37.5  -62.5%  55 57.4  2.4 -42.6% 
4. Chemical means 
of plant protection 
(in 100% calculation 
to the operated sub-
stance)  
Thsd. 
tones   
111 5.8  -105.2  10.6 15.5 4.9  -106.1 
% 100  5.2  -94.8%  9.5 14 -4.5 -86% 
5. Syntethic resins 
and plastic materials  
Thsd. 
tones   
3258 1618  -1640  2576 4464 -1888  +1206 
% 100  50  -50%  79 137  +58 +37% 
6. Chemical deter-
gent agent  
Thsd. 
tones   
876 253  -623  436 807 -371  -69 
% 100  29  -71%  50 92 +42 -8% 
7.  Tyres for trucks, 
buses, trolley buses  
Mio. 
Pieces. 
19.7 7.4 -12.3  10.1 11.8 -1.7  -7.9 
% 100  37.6  -62.4%  51.3 60  8.6 -40% 
8. Tyres for cars   Mio. 
Pieces. 
15,9 14.6  1.3  17.7 29.4 -11.7  +13.5 
% 100  91.8  8.2%  111.3 184,9 73.6 +84.9% 




tones   
7186 4100  -2307  5818 7203 1385  +17 






tones   
3848 3600  -248  4016 7277 +3261  +3429 




+84.7 +89.1%  
19 
 
Production of sulphur 
11. Sulphur  Thsd. 
tones   
2499 3986  +1487  496
6 
6460  +1494  +3961 
% 100 159.5 +59.5%  199 259  +59.5 +159% 
Production of photogoods 
12. Kino-
photofilm,35 mm 
Mio. m  816  -  -  14,1 8,7  -5.4 -807.3 
 %  100  -  -  1.7 1.1 -0.6  -98.9% 
Source: on Basis of: Promyshlennost Rossii (Russian Industry), GOSKOMSTAT, 2002, 186-196; 
Promyshlennost Rossiiю 2008, Rosstat, 2008,  220, 221, 227; Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik 
(Russian official statistical yearbook). 2002, GOSKOMSTAT, 2002, 186; Rossisky Statistichesky 
Eshegodnik . 2008, Rosstat, 2008, 413, 414, 415. 
 
As is demonstrated by the table, there are also several product segments in Rus-
sia’s chemical and petrochemical industries that are far from recovery. More 
than that, if production has declined by more than 50 to 60 per cent during the 
period of 1990 to 2007, there is almost no sign of recovery whatsoever. As a 
consequence, the production in segments like photographic films or chemical 
pesticides has expired or is about to expire. During the period between 1990 
and 2007, the production within the segments caustic soda, chemical means of 
plant protection, tyres for trucks and buses as well as photographic films 
dropped by more than a quarter.  
 
This is not necessarily in every case due to insufficient competitiveness of Rus-
sian producers but may also be attributed to technical change in general causing 
certain products (like video tapes) to disappear because of emerging new tech-
nical standards. However, there is indication that Russian producers are far 
from recovering pre-crisis production levels especially in segments of more 
elaborated products. If we consider that the increasing share of imports of 
chemical products is largely due to sophisticated products like chemical deter-
gents, input materials for the construction industry and car-production it be-
comes evident that Russian producers appear to have difficulties in meeting the 
sophisticated domestic demand which is increasing especially because of rising 
real household incomes. At present, the country’s agrochemical production ca-
pacities are far from being able to meet domestic demand.  
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Like chemical and petrochemical production in general, Russia’s CPS is very 
capital-intensive. As a consequence, increasing market shares of imported 
products reduced capacity utilisation rates in Russia’s CPS and induced a ten-
dency towards progressively rising unit costs. According to Ageev and Salichov 
(2002: 132), reductions in capacity utilisation rates of 50 per cent have induced 
cost increases of 20 to 30 per cent. Thus, the question arises whether firms in 
Russia’s CPS still operate profitably? 
B.  Financial Conditions of Firms in Russia’s CPS 
Like other major industries, the Russian CPS so far operates profitably on aver-
age, although a decline in average profits can be observed between 1999 and 
2003 which may be both due to increased competition or decreasing competi-
tiveness. Right before the financial crisis, the industry seems to have recovered 
to some extent in terms of profitability. 
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Table 5.  Profitability (profit-turnover-ratio) of Production, in per cent, years 
1995-2007
8 
 1995  1997  1998 1999  2000 2001 2002  2003  2007 
Total  industry  17  8 11 20 19  16 13  12 15.7* 
Fuel industry  17  12  14  31  34  26  17  16 (17)  23** 
CPS 6  (17)  4 9  18 15  10  8  8.6 (6)  16 
Machine construction 
and metal processing 
9 (17)  7  9  15  12  12  10  8 (3)  8 
* including extraction of natural resources, manufacturing industries, energy, gas and water pro-
duction and distribution; 
** fuel production.  
Source: Rossisky statistichesky eshegodnik 2004, Moscow, GOSKOMSTAT, 2004, 359, 376, 385, 
387; in brackets:
9 Rossija w cifrach (Russia in Figures), GOSKOMSTAT, 2004, 184, 191, 194, 195; 
authors’ calculations, Rossisky statistichesky eshegodnik. 2008, Rosstat, 2008, 366, 387, 413, 424. 
 
Is is remarkable, however, that among the major sectors Russia’s CPS exhibits 
a comparatively low profitability. If we look at the sector more precisely, we 
find that average figures are not very informative here as the number of unprof-
itable firms has risen dramatically since 1992 (GOSKOMSTAT 2003b: 365). 
Roughly 30 to 35 per cent of all firms in these sectors must be considered par-
                                                            
8   The table shows profit-turnover ratios (in per cent) which is not identical with the original data pub-
lished by GOSKOMSTAT (Tab. A – see appendix) . As we were told on our request, GOSKOM-
STAT defines profitability as profit divided by original costs. Thus, compared to more common 
measures, like profits divided by turnover, GOSKOMSTAT’s profitability figures will be higher if 
firms make profit, because in this case turnover exceeds costs, making the denominator in the 
GOSKOMSTAT-definition smaller than in turnover-based indicators. If, on the other hand, firms in-
cur losses, this will, in the GOSKOMSTAT-definition lead to smaller figures in negative profitability 
as in this case costs in the denominator will be greater than turnover. As a consequence, the data 
could not be directly compared to usual profitability data, so we had to calculate the more commonly 
used profit-turnover-ratios. 
9   It is puzzling, however, that data from different sources, namely Rossisky Statistichesky eshegodnik 
and Rossija w cifrach occasionally diverges, so we decided to show divergent data provided by the 
latter source in brackets. Similarily, there is puzzling divergence in the statistical data of “coefficient 
of equipment renewal” for the period 2003-2007 – despite an identical definition of the term. See 
Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik 2006 and Promyschlennost Rossii 2008, Rosstat, 375.   
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ticularly vulnerable in situations of economic crisis. The share of unprofitable 
firms is particularly high in some regions. In 2002, 41.8 per cent of all compa-
nies were defined as unprofitable in Centralny Federalny Okrug/District, in 
Privolshsky Federalny Okrug/District there were 45.7, in the Republic of Tatar-
stan, Bashkortostan, and Samarskaya Oblast/Region the respective figures were 
41.8, 38.3 and 43.9 per cent respectively (GOSKOMSTAT 2003d: 814-815). 
However, the figures for 2007 picture a considerable drop in the ratio of unprof-
itable firms (table 6). Unfortunately, one has to be cautious to interpret this as a 
sign of improvement. Once again, a change in statistical coverage might at least 
partly drive the effect. After 2003, statistics were amended in order to include 
all firms of the industry, whereas the older statistics included only manufactur-




Table 6.  Ratio of Unprofitable Firms in Major Sectors of the Russian 
Industry 1992-2007, in per cent,  from total number of firms 
 1992  1995  1998  2002  2003  2007 
Whole economy   15.3  34.2  53.2  43.5  43 (41.3)  25.5 (23.4) 
Industry; thereof:  7.2  26.4  48.8  45.1  44.5 (42.0)  - 
Fuel industry  14.1  32.1  53.9  48.2  48.9 (46.6)  31.9 (29.2)* 
CPS  2.0  14.7  41.5  42.4  40.5 (38.7)  29.1 (29.2)** 
Machine construction 
and metal processing 
4.9  24.5  47.2  40.4   40.5 (37.7)  21.4(17.9) 
* fuel production; 
** chemistry only; 
Source: Rossisky statististitschesky eshegodnik 2004, Moscow, GOSKOMSTAT, 2004, 589; in 
brackets: Rossija w cifrach (Russia in Figures), GOSKOMSTAT, 2004, 333; Rossisky statististit-
schesky eshegodnik 2008, Rosstat, 2008, 682; in brackets: Rossija w cifrach. 2008, Rosstat, 2008, 
380-381.  
 
                                                            
10   A cautious conclusion could be that the firms working around the core (‘old’) industry structure in 
Russia’s CPS tend to be smaller, younger, more competitive and less unprofitable. At the same time, 
this would imply that profits in these areas should not be supracompetitively high.  
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If such a high share of firms makes no profits (table 6) while the average profit-
ability of an industry as a whole is quite satisfactory (table 5), this might imply 
that the remaining firms make rather high profits, perhaps pointing towards de-
ficiencies in the competitive structure of these markets. Thus, Russia’s indus-
trial landscape appears to be divided in unprofitable and highly profitable firms. 
On the one hand, among the former there might be some share of entrants 
which have not yet passed the break-even point. On the other hand, smaller and 
younger firms seems to perform better than (some of) the big old industrial ones 
since the inclusion of (in tendency) smaller firms from the related non-
manufacturing parts of the industry considerably reduced the share of of un-
profitable units. Thus, there could also be a three way structure: (i) big manu-
facturers enjoying high profits (due to anticompetitive gains?), (ii) unprofitable 
and uncompetitive (big?) manufacturers and (iii) competitive (and smaller and 
younger?) firms in the neigbouring areas within the industry with small com-
petitive profits. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain data that allows to dis-
criminate between the hypotheses. However, some of the following considera-
tions on technological development and innovative competitiveness might in 
tendncy support the latter reasoning. 
C.  State of Technical Development and Technical Competitiveness of 
Russia’s CPS 
The degree of attrition of equipment in the Russian CPS has deteriorated sig-
nificantly between 1970 and 1990, as is also indicated by the equipment re-
newal coefficient (table 7). 
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Table 7.  Degree of Attrition and Equipment Renewal Coefficients in Major 
Industrial Sectors (End of Year) 
 1970  1990  1998  2002  2003  2007 
1  2 1 2 1 2 1 2  1  2  1  2 
Industry total  25.7 
 
10.6 46.4 6.9 52.9 1.2 52.9 1.8  51.4  1.8  45.7**  2.2****  
(14.6 
A) 
Fuel industry  34.7 
 
10.0 46.7 8.1 54.7 1.7 52.6 3.2  50.7  3.5 50.3***  2.3****  
(14.3 
B) 
CPS  22.1 
 










12.7 47.5  6.6  53.2 0.4  54.8 0.8  52.8  0,9  41.8 
* - data calculated as average values for the industries coke & oil, chemistry and rubber & synthetics; - data 
on file with authors, 
** data calculated as average values for resource extraction and manufacturing,  
*** - data for Brennstoff-Energie-Bodenschätze-Förderung,  
**** data of 2005 on Basis of (2007 data on file with authors),  
in brackets: 
A  average value for resource extraction and manufacturing (Promyschlennost Rossii, 2008, 
Rosstat, 110),
11 
B  value for energy industry (Promyschlennost Rossii, 2008, Rosstat, 110); 
1 – Degree of attrition of equipment, end of year, large and medium-sized facilities. 
2 – Coefficient of equipment renewal (share of capital stock having been put into operation in the year com-
pared to value of capital stock by the end of the year), in constant prices, large and medium-sized production 
facilities. 
Source: Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Yearbook), GOSKOMSTAT, Mos-
cow, 2003, 354; Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Yearbook), GOSKOMS-
TAT, Moscow, 2004, 374; Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik. 2008, Rosstat, 2008, 386;  Promyschlennost 
Rossii. 2008, Rosstat, 2008, 110-112, www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b06_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/11-28.htm. 
 
                                                            
11   The data on the equipment renewal coefficient considerably varies among the available Russian sta-
tistical sources in the priod 2003-2007 despite an (apparently) consistent definition of the term 
'equipment renewal coefficient'. Compare, for instance, Promyschlennost Rossii. 2008 (11,9 – 14,5  
per cent; case A) with Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Yearbook) 
2006 and Rossija w cifrach. 2004 (2,8 – 1,7  per cent; case B). In a response to our query, ROSSTAT 
explains the differences with the use of different norming price standards, namely reference prices 
(year 2000) in case B and non-corrected contemporary prices in case A.  
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Obviously, there is a lack of renewal investments that turned out to be particu-
larly dramatic after the economic crisis of 1998/1999. Only the fuel industry 
has hesitantly begun to recover. It is puzzling, however, that firms in the Rus-
sian CPS – at least those firms that made substantial profits – hardly made any 
investments. Rather, the very small equipment renewal coefficients indicate that 
firms largely relied on a capital stock which had been installed years before the 
transition crisis. After capacity utilisation had reached a minimum during the 
crisis of 1998, several firms just had to increase utilisation rates to meet increas-
ing demand during economic recovery after 2000. Consequently, profits were 
mainly due to rising utilisation rates – at least in some segments (table 9) and 
by saving investment costs instead of expanding capacities. The question arises, 
however, why firms did not anticipate the current situation of capacity limits, of 
intensified competition with world market competitors producing more sophis-
ticated products with more efficient capital stocks, increasing prices for input 
materials and rising wages. While this question cannot be answered extensively 
here, the hypothesis might be worth discussing that after having experienced 
economic instability for several years after economic transition, a large share of 
managers developed a preference for short-term optimizing behaviour. Another 
reason, however, might be some confidence into protective measures from the 
side of political authorities. Again, verification of this hypothesis is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
Table 8.  Capacity Utilisation Ratios for Selected Products of the CPS 
  1990 1998  2001 2003 2007 
mineral  fertilisers  75 47  67 73 87 
plant  protectants  46 7  21 14 23 
synthetic resins and plastic materials  84  45  62  74  78 
laquers  and  varnishes  74 15  22 24 39 
tyres for passenger and agricultural 
vehicles, motorcycles 
91 59  76 83 87 
Source: Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Yearbook), GOSKOMS-
TAT, Moscow, 2004, 370; Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik. 2008, Rosstat, 2008, 383-384. 
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The constitution of the capital stock of Russia’s CPS is quite representative for 
many sectors of the Russian economy. The average age of of industrial equip-
ment was about 20.7 years by the end of 2003. The age structure is as follows. 
Only 7.8 per cent of all production facilities are less than five years old; 4.9 per 
cent were installed six to ten years ago; 16.4 per cent 11 to 15 years ago; 22.7 
per cent are older than 16 years and 48.2 per cent were installed more than 20 
years ago (GOSKOMSTAT 2004b: 372).  
 
According to the data, in 2002 81 per cent of the equipment that was suspended 
from the production process had to be turned off because of attrition, while only 
11 per cent were decommissed because of inefficiency (GOSKOMSTAT 2003a: 
197). The procurement of equipment is dominated by machinery from domestic 
production (89 per cent); 27 per cent of the equipment procured is used mate-
rial, predominantly from domestic production (GOSKOMSTAT 2003a: 197). 
The share of completely attrited material is 29.1 per cent, almost any fifth 
building is fully worn out and 16.9 per cent of transport capacities must be con-
sidered entirely worn out (GOSKOMSTAT 2003b: 106). The average utlisation 
ratio of production capacities in the CPS differs widely between products. 
While it is at some 80 per cent in the fields of polyvinyl chloride resins and vi-
nylchloride-copolymers it does not exceed 22 per cent in the production of lac-
quers and varnishes (GOSKOMSTAT 2003b: 183). 
 
To sum up, the capital stock of Russia’s CPS is in a critical state and, as a con-
sequence, its productivity levels are rather low compared to western or Asian 
producers. This is particularly true for production facilities that are completely 
in Russian ownership. Obviously, investors’ inclination to install more recent 
technology, entailing higher productivity and competitiveness, is greater if eq-
uity is at least partially owned by foreign investors (table 10). One might expect 
that the situation for medium-sized and large firms in Russian ownership is 
unlikely to improve significantly after WTO-accession as long as input costs 
and real exchange rates will continue to rise and protection against foreign 
competitors will be reduced. Note that attrition and equipment renewal data in  
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table 8 is only given for large and medium-sized firms, i.e. the incumbent firms 
in Russia’s CPS. The situation for entrant firms is not that clear. The mere fact 
that their average labour productivity is lower than that of firms being partially 
owned by foreigners does not necessarily mean that they all rely on outdated 
material, perhaps purchased on markets for used machinery in Russia due to no-
torious capital scarcity. Rather, as already mentioned before, these productivity 
levels might also be a consequence of above-average R&D activities, particu-
larly small scale effects or other phenomena typically occurring at early stages 
of product and firm life cycles. 
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Table 9.  Ownership Structures in Leading Sectors of the Russian Industry, 
2003 (2002 г.)/2007, end of year, per cent  
   Number of firms  Output  Number of 
industrial person-
nel employed 









joint Russian and foreign property
3) 
100 (100)/100 
3.0 (3.1)/ 3.3 
2.1 (2.1)/ 5.9 
87.9 (87.8)/ 80.7 
 
0.5 (0.6)/ 5.3 
4.8 (4.9)/ 4.8* 
1.7 (1.5)/- 
100 (100)/100 
7.9 (8.2)/ 4.8** 
1.4 (1.3)/ 0.1 



















property of social or religious 
organisations   
mixed Russian
2) 






























 including property of Russian citizens with permanent residence abroad.  
2) – including property of retail cooperatives,
 
3) – including foreign property, 
* “other forms of property, incl. mixed Russian
, foreign,  joint Russian and foreign”, 
** manufacturing industries, 
*** chemistry. 
Source: Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian official statistical yearbook), GOSKOMSTAT, 
Moscow, 2003, 346; 2004, 365; Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik. 2008, Rosstat, 339-341, 378-
379.  
 
According to table 9, privatisation has made the most significant progress in the 
CPS. More than nine out of ten of all firms are in private hands in periode 
2002-2003. However, from 2003 to 2007 this figure has significantly dropped 
again to 78 per cent. Only a very small share of the firms operating in the CPS 
is owned by the state in Periode 2002-2003. Again, a certain drawback can be 
identified thereafter. The figures for 2007 can be interpreted as the starting 
point for a (limited?) de-privatization process with the state and the communes 
regaining control over a larger share of the number of CPS companies. Yet, the  
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size of private firms owned completely by Russians tends to be small as they 
contribute only roughly 45-47 per cent to total output in the sector in Periode 
2002-2007. If the equity is in part owned by the state (mixed Russian property) 
or foreign investors, firms’ size is usually far above the average. Obviously, 
firms which are at least partially owned by foreign investors tend to have high-
est labour productivity. We obtain similar results if we look at other leading 
sectors, like fuel and machinery construction. Surprisingly, private firms owned 
by Russians seem to have the lowest labour productivity, while firms in public-
private ownership range in-between. One reasonable assumption might be that 
the smaller firms owned by Russian citizens so far have operated with a capital 
stock which is smaller than the average, so that they produce with a lower capi-
tal intensity and only moderate scale effects. Another, perhaps complementary, 
hypothesis is that they are particularly R&D intensive and operate at initial 
stages of product life cycles. Thus there appear to have been some entries of re-
search intensive firms, presumably in niche segements. Obviously, small firms 
are beginning to play a role in the CPS. Especially after the economic downturn 
in 1998, small firms apparently entered the markets to some degree (table 10). 
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Table 10. Number of Firms and Employment, Small and Medium-sized 
Firms 1998-2007 
  Number of firms (end of 
year),  
Production Volume   Employment  


























































































































* The 2007 figure refers to ‚turnover of small enterprises’ as opposed to ‚production volume’ in the 
other years. According to Promyschlennost Rossii. 2008//Rosstat, 2008, 375, ’turnover of small en-
terprises’ is defined as „… the value of self-produced and shipped commodities, … as well as the 
revenue from sales of on the side acquired commodities (without value-added taxes, excises and 
other obligatory payments) …”, whereas ‘production volume’ is defined as “…the volume of 
shipped commodities – the output value that factually was shipped to the costumers during the re-
porting period” (Promyschlennost Rossii. 2002//GOSKOMSTAT, 2002 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B02_48/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d020/i021700r.htm). Unfortunately, this dif-
ference in definition can not fully convincingly explain the difference in the figures. 
** average of “coke and oil production, chemical production as well as rubber and plastic com-
modity production“,  
Source: Promyshlennost Rossii (Russian Industry), GOSKOMSTAT, 2002, 95, Rossija w cifrach 
(Russia in figures), 2004, GOSKOMSTAT, 164, Promyshlennost Rossii. 2008, Rosstat, 2008, 94-95.  
 
Table 10 indicates that small and medium-sized firms in the CPS appear to have 
entered a phase of consolidation. While the recent decline in the number of op-
erating firms indicates some shake-out, employment continues to increase.  
  
31 
A look at profitability figures displays a typical picture. Not surprisingly, sec-
tors characterized by lower concentration ratios (machine construction and 
metal processing; CPS) also exhibit lower profit ratios, compared to other sec-
tors like fuel industry or non-ferrous metallurgy. However, lower profits ratios 
due to a more competitive market structure should in sum exert a positive influ-
ence on technological development, technological competitiveness and industry 
dynamics in the future.
12 So far, SMEs mostly contributed to job creation rather 
than to profits, but this might be typical for growing firms which predominantly 
produce niche products. Most of the small firms are located in Moscow, the sur-
rounding regions, and in St. Petersburg, where firms find a surplus supply of 
skilled labour force and a substantial demand for products or services of SMEs. 
D. International Competitiveness of Russia’s CPS 
a. Technological  Competitiveness 
According to the GOSKOMSTAT-terminology, innovative activity is defined 
by the elaboration and introduction of new or improved products, technological 
processes and other kinds of innovative activities. Despite this broad definition, 
however, only a small minority of the firms in Russia’s CPS can be classified as 
innovation active at all. Only roughly a half (53 per cent) of Russia’s industrial 
firms entertains product or process innovations. Most product innovations are 
created in machinery construction. Although slightly above the industry aver-
age, the share of innovative firms in Russia’s CPS remained extremely low and 
                                                            
12   There is a well-discussed trade-off between incentives to innovate (originating from and sustained by 
competitive pressure) and the financial means to innovate (which can next to capital markets originate 
from supra-competitive profits and scale effects of highly concentrated markets). Therefore, Aghion et 
al. (2005) argue for a inverted U-shaped relationship between market concentration and innovation 
(technological progress). In theory, there can be too much competition for technological progress. 
However, against the background of the industry history of Russia, it is very doubtful whether this is 
the case here. Instead, it is very likely that there was not enough competition intensity (too much con-
centration) in the past and more competitive pressure drives technological progress. This corresponds 
to modern insights in economics that view competition as the major and indispensable driving-force 
of technological competitiveness (Kerber 2006, 2010; Baker 2007, 2008). See also Budzinski (2008) 
and Cantner (2010).  
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was almost constant during recent years. In general, innovative activity appears 
to be located mostly in larger firms disposing of resources to finance R&D ex-
penditures. However, this might be due to a measurement bias, focusing on lar-
ger firms and neglecting (less visible) innovation activities in smaller firms. 
 
Table 11. Numbers of Firms in Russian Industry and CPS Undertaking 
Innovative Activities, Years 1998-2003 (in brackets. shares of 
innovative firms in per cent) 




SMEs (end of 
year) in indus-
try (share in 
prozent) 



















































































                                                            
13   “Innovation-active firms” in Promyschlennost Rossii. 2005 and “organizations that conduct techno-
logical innovation” in Promyschlennost Rossii. 2008. The numbers are the result of a regular survey 
conducted by the Russian official statistical observation.   
14   The significant increase in 2007 firm numbers is a result of a change of statistical coverage (Promy-
schlennost Rossii. 2005, Rosstat, 68-69; Promyschlennost Rossii. 2008, Rosstat, 60-61). Until 2003, 
the number of firms reflects the number of so-called ‘working industrial organisations’, whereas the 
data from 2007 covers all firms. For instance, in 2003 the number of ‚working industrial organiza-
tions’ accounted for 32.3 per cent of the firms in the industry. Note, however, that the 2007 number of 
SME’s does not correspond to the extended coverage of firms. Actually, the share of SME’s some-
what increased from about 15.7 per cent (1998) if the modified statistical coverage is taken into ac-



































































* data covers resource extraction, manufacturing industries and energy and gas industries (Pro-
myschlennost Rossii. 2008//Rosstat, 2008, 333), 
** data covers coke and oil production, chemistry and rubber and synthetics (Promyschlennost 
Rossii. 2008, Rosstat, 2008, 60), 
- no data available.  
Source: data compiled from Promyshlennost Rossii (Russian Industry), GOSKOMSTAT, 2002, 95, 
414, Rossija w cifrach (Russia in Figures), GOSKOMSTAT, 2004, 164, 184, 309, Rossisky Statisti-
chesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Yearbook), GOSKOMSTAT, Moscow, 2004, 554; 
Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Yearbook). 2008, Rosstat, 339-340, 
625-626; Promyschlennost Rossii. 2005, Rosstat, 2005, 69-70, 420; Promyschlennost Rossii. 2008, 
Rosstat, 2008, 333-335. 
 
Among the most important factors restricting Russian firms’ R&D-engagement 
are a lack of own financial recources, inacceptable conditions on financial mar-
kets to obtain loans for R&D investments (for instance, high interest rates, re-
luctance of lending institutions to secure the long-term financing of enterprises 
and shortages in general credit volumes) and the duration of the time period for 
R&D projects (GOSKOMSTAT 2003c, 541). 43 per cent of the firms mention a 
lack of own resources and too high costs of R&D (18 per cent) as major im-
pediments to carry out R&D. Many firms also attribute this to limitations of in-
novative potentials of organisation (42 per cent) and to a lack of qualified staff. 
Among the most important obstacles to R&D, firms identify deficits in the legal 
and regulatory framework (see also in more detail Gorodnikova & Gosteva 
2009) and a lack of public (financial) support of innovative activity (26 per 
cent) as well as an insufficient demand for innovative products by costumers 
(24 per cent) (GOSKOMSTAT 2003c: 541). In addition, among the other rea-
sons for the moderate innovative activity are inefficient utilisation of scientific  
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and technological information due to scarcity of skilled personnel and of ser-
vices for patenting and licensing within the firms (GOSKOMSTAT 2003c: 541). 
 
Table 12. Technology Trade in Major Industrial Sectors, 2003 (in brackets: 
2002)/2007 






















































2 (2)/ -  1 (1)/-  20.8 (20.8)/ -  65 (71)/ - 12 (15)/-  33426 (4392.8)/ 
- 
CPS  13 (7)/ - 
 
6 (5)/-  261.3 (250.9)/ - 47(36)/- 
 












































60 (58)/-  26389.5 
(42744)/- 
* data covers resource extraction, manufacturing industries and energy and gas industries, 
- data not available.  
Source: Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Yearbook), GOSKOMS-
TAT, Moscow, 2003, 535; Rossija w cifrach (Russia in figures), GOSKOMSTAT, Moscow, 2004, 
307; Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnikю 2008, Rosstat, 2008. 624. 
 
An indicator for Russia’s present international competitiveness may be its tech-
nology trade balance. A glance at it immediately reveals that Russia is a net im-
porter of technology, both as far as the number of contracts is concerned and  
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(even more clearly) as far as their transaction volume is concerned. The value 
of technologies transferred to countries abroad by the Russian industry is about 
ten times smaller than the respective transaction value of technology imports. 
While technology exports of Russia’s industry amount to only a small share of 
the country’s entire technology exports (12.6 per cent), industrial firms are the 
most important technology importers (58.4 per cent). While industrial technol-
ogy export is dominated by the machinery construction and metal processing 
sector, CPS is absolutely insignificant in this field. Like other industrial sectors, 
Russia’s CPS relies on technology imports as characterised by a transaction 
volume of imports being more than five times greater than the transaction vol-
ume of technology exports. Most important technology exporters to Russia are 
Germany (24 per cent), United Kingdom (14 per cent) and the US (13 per cent), 
while Russian technology is mainly exported to the US (29 per cent) and to 
Germany (14 per cent). 
 
These figures are quite difficult to interpret and have to be looked at in the con-
text of other findings already made here. First of all, one must consider that the 
dominance of technology imports over technology exports is nothing unusual 
for transition countries. More than that, it must be regarded as an essential re-
quirement for technological catch-up. There are several examples of countries 
with successful technology assimilation, such as the ‘Asian Tigers’. To come to 
grips with the situation in Russia’s CPS we have to consider the technology 
trade figures in the context of other indicators. One important question in this 
respect is whether technology imports are complements or substitutes of domes-
tic R&D. So far, one cannot conclude that technology import and domestic 
R&D are complements, because domestic R&D continues to remain on a very 
low level in spite of increasing technology imports. Technology transfer in-
duced modernisation of Russian industrial firms must be considered as limited 
given the fact that firms still operate with outdated material and have gone to a 
period of losing profitability. Thus, there is so far hardly any evidence that 
technology import produces sustained country-endogenous technological pro-
gress across industrial firms. This does not exclude, however, that the absorp- 
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tion of technologies from abroad might be asymmetric. As already mentioned 
above, profitability levels differ strongly between firms. It seems plausible to 
assume that technology import is confined to a limited number of innovative 
firms. Thus, an alternative explanation for different profit levels would be at 
hand. However, such a conclusion must remain speculative as disaggregated 
data in this field is not available. Nevertheless, we have to expect a significant 
shake-out in the nearer future which will be additionally intensified by Russia’s 
WTO accession. 
 
One might be more optimistic about the future of Russia’s CPS if it were in a 
process of technological catching-up. Again, the overall picture is not very en-
couraging. One explanation of this insuffient innovative activity might be that 
Russian firms obviously find themselves in a situation with restrictive condi-
tions for the funding of R&D investments which is in part due to the fact that 
private funding of risky R&D activities is virtually nonexistent in Russia. 
 
Table 13. Structure of Funding of Innovative Activities of Industrial 
Corporations in Russia, years 1995-2007, per cent 
 1995  1998 1999  2000  2001  2005  2007 
Own resources  87   75   85   82   87  78.7  79.6 
Federal budget  2   4  3  3  2  4.4  3.8 
Budgets of RF-subjects and local budgets  2   0  0  1  1  0.1  0.4 
Extra-budgetary funds  4   3  3  3  2  0.1  0.1 
Foreign investments  5   10   7  5  2  1.5  0.3 
Others  0   8   2  6  6  14.6  15.8 
Source: Promyshlennost Rossii (Russian Industry), GOSKOMSTAT, 2002, 418; Promyschlennost 
Rossii. 2008, Rosstat.  
 
Unfortunately, there are no figures available about the share of financing of 
R&D provided by banks or other private organisations. But again the mere fact 
that only a stagnant fraction of roughly two per cent of the firms in Russia’s 
CPS are innovation active indicates that private loans do not play a major role 
in the R&D-environment. It is puzzling that the engagement of foreign inves- 
37 
tors constantly declined since 1998. Apparently, it takes time to restore confi-
dence after the crisis of 1998. 
 
Industrial firms in Russia mainly rely on their own resources in their R&D 
funding. More than that, as the magnitude of resources dedicated to R&D re-
mains limited, most of industrial firms’ innovativeness is not based on their 
own R&D activities but stems mainly from the procurement of machinery with 
innovations embodied in them (table 14).  
 
Table 14. Structure of Industrial Spending on Technological Innovations 
(shares in per cent) 
   1995  1998 1999  2000 2001  2005*  2007* 
1  R&D for product and process in-
novations 
26 22  15  14  18  16  17 
2  Procurement of machinery with 
embodeid innovations 
44 43  49  58  60  60  58 
3  Purchase of new technologies  19  3  8  4  1  1  2 
4 Software  procurement  0  1  3  2  2  2  3 
5  Production planning, other ways of 
production preparation; introduc-
tion of new services and produc-
tion methods 
2 17 10  10  10 11  12 
6  Education, enhancement of human 
capital 
1 1  0  1  0  0  1 
7 Marketing  research  0  1  1  2  1  1  0 
8 Other  8  12  14  9  8  9  7 
* data covers resource extraction, manufacturing industries and energy and gas industries. 
Source: Promyshlennost Rossii (Russian Industry), GOSKOMSTAT, 2002, 418; Rossiysky statis-
tisky eshegodnik. 2008, Rosstat, 626. 
 
Russian industrial firms obviously seldom pioneer industrial R&D but rely 
merely on technology adoption. If industrial competition is performance based, 
as will mostly be the case in this field, it is not surprising that Russian firms 
find themselves in a situation of their international competitiveness being con-
stantly reduced. In addition to that there is a danger of being further left behind 
because of reduced capacities to absorb recent technologies due to the firms’ in-
sufficient human capital investments.  
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To sum up this part, we cannot falsify the hypothesis that high profitability of at 
least some firms in Russia’s CPS stems from the creation and/or adoption of 
technological innovations. Nevertheless, Russia’s CPS in general cannot be 
characterised as innovation active as only a small fraction of firms is involved 
in innovative activites. As world market competition in the chemical and petro-
chemical industriey is not only price-, but also performance-based, increased 
exposure to the world market after WTO-accession will encounter Russia’s 
CPS in a critical condition, especially as adoption of innovations created else-
where, while perhaps sufficient to gain a leading position in domestic competi-
tion, will only have a limited competitive impact for Russian firms having to 
operate on the world markets. If we scrutinise the world market position of 
Russia’s CPS, the impression of insufficient competitiveness on domestic and 
world markets is confirmed. 
b.  World Market Position of Russia’s CPS 
As it is well known, Russia is one of the world’s leading exporters of mineral 
oil and gas. Thus, it is not astonishing that mineral oil products hold the leading 
position in the country’s export structure. While exports of commodities from 
the CPS traditionally do not play a leading role in Russia’s foreign trade, the 
sector is strongly export-oriented as more than 30 per cent of its production is 
sold abroad. The picture is becoming particularly interesting if we look at the 
import structure. Here, imports of commodities from the chemical sector rank 
third behind imports of machinery, vehicles and production facilities as well as 
manufactured goods and agricultural raw materials. The growing importance of 
imported CPS products was one of the most obvious changes in the country’s 
trade structure between 1995 and 2003. 
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Table 15. Structure of Commodity Export/Import in Russia, in years 1995, 
2003 and 2007, per cent 
 Export  Import 
1995 2003 2007 1995  2003  2007 
1. Manufactured goods and agricul-
tural raw materials (except textile) 
1.5  1.5  1.8 29.4  21.4 13.7 
2. Mineral products   40.4  60.0  68.4  2.9  1.2  0.9 
3. Commodities from the chemical 
sector, caoutchouc 
9.9  6.2  5.4  11.4  18.4  14.4 
4. Tanning raw materials, furs and ar-
ticles of them   
0.5  0.2  0.1 0.4  0.4  0.4 
5. Products of timber and pulp and 
paper industry 
6.1 4.3 3.4 3.0  4.5 2.6 
6. Textile, textile articles and shoes  1.3  0.5  0.1  4.7  4.1  4.3 
7. Metals, precious stones and arti-
cles of them   
19.5  21.4  16.4 5.0  5.0 5.9 
8. Machinery, vehicles and produc-
tion facilities 
8.3  7.1  3.4 38.7  40.8 54.3 
9.  Others  1.3 1.3 1.0 4.5  4.2 3.5 
Source: Rossiysky statistischesky eshegodnik. 2008, Rosstat, 768-770.  
 
This does not necessarily imply that Russia’s CPS in general is not competitive 
on the world market. Rather, one has to further disaggregate the data to obtain a 
clearer picture. For example, Russia is one of the world’s leading exporters of 
mineral fertilisers and used to be a major producer of chemical fibres before 
1990. Currently Russia’s CPS appears to be left behind especially in segments 
of more sophisticated products like detergents, chemicals for the construction 
sector and specific lacquers and varnishes for the automobile industry. Thus, 
the limited technological competitiveness, especially in segments of more re-
fined products, puts large parts of Russia’s CPS at risk. Limited foreign invest-
ment figures do not indicate substantial changes of this situation: 
 
If one takes a look at the historical development of foreign investment volumes 
in major Russian industries, it is somewhat surprising that in the machine con-
struction and metal processing sector the economic downturn of 1998 and 1999 
hardly caused any lasting damages. As foreign investment is not only driven by 
risk perceptions but also by long term profit expectations, many investors obvi- 
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ously did not feel deterred from entering the Russian market in the aforemen-
tioned sector. Nevertheless foreign investments almost collapsed in the fuel in-
dustry and in the CPS. Notwithstanding the lower level of foreign investment in 
this field, the sector reacted very sensitively to economic crisis – yet not as 
dramatically as the fuel sector – but recovered quickly after 1999.  
 
Table 16. Foreign Investments in Important Industrial Sectors, years 1995-
2007 









































                   
Fuel industry  262  8.8  1880  16.0  621  5.7  5305  17.9  15860
** 
31.6 







197 6.6  305  2.6 470 4.3  769  2.6  927**
** 
1.85 
* data covers resource extraction, manufacturing industries and energy and gas industries, 
** data covers energy resource extraction, 
*** data covers chemical industrie, 
**** data covers the production of machines and equipment. 
Source: Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Yearbook), GOSKOMS-
TAT, Moscow, 2003, 604; Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik. 2008, Rosstat, 733.  
 
In general, FDI in Russia has increased between 1995 and 2007 but neverthe-
less remains at a comparative low level. Only the fuel industry has been able to 
attract substantial FDI during recent years. Obviously, foreign investors are at-
tracted by high profitability levels in the fuel industry and hesitate to invest in 
the CPS and machinery construction where investments appeared less profit- 
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able. Unlike the fuel industry where substitution of domestic production 
through imports is impossible, production in Russia’s CPS is in part substituted 
by imports. In spite of existing import tariffs for refined products, firms appar-
ently found it more favourable to produce these commodities elsewhere. There 
appear to be several reasons for this kind of behaviour. The most important rea-
son, however, seems to be ongoing deficits in contract enforceability, especially 
for investors holding minority interests of a company’s equity in Russia.
15 An-
other reason, however, seems to be connected with the fact that firms in Rus-
sia’s CPS are typically vertically integrated. If investors try to build up on-site 
upstream fabrication, then they become competitors of upstream producers of 
vertically integrated Russian firms and might face difficulties to enter the mar-
ket (entry barriers through vertical integration). In addition, due to the limited 
capacity of firms in Russia’s CPS to optimally refine high-quality input goods 
from Western producers, the use of high-quality inputs is not the preferable op-
tion in many instances. 
E. Regional  Impacts 
The production of chemical products and of products containig a large portion 
of input goods from the chemical industry is geographically concentrated in 
three Russian regions, namely Centralny, Privolshsky and Sibirsky Federalny 
Okrug/district. 
 
                                                            
15   See on the shortcomings of joint ventures and other cooperation patterns between Russian and foreign 
business partners and the consequences of these deficiencies Jasper,  Gumerova & Schaimijeva 
(2003) and Mescherjakova (2008).  
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Table 17. Production of Chemical Goods and Goods Containing High 
Portions of Chemical Inputs: Shares of Leading Russian Regions, 















































































- data not availabled, 
* 2006.  
Source: Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Yearbook), GOSKOMS-
TAT, Moscow, 2003, 349-353; Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical 
Yearbook), GOSKOMSTAT, Moscow, 2004, 366, 369; Promyschlennost Rossii. 2008, Rosstat, 223, 
229, 261; Regiony Rossii. 2007, Rosstat, 513, 515. 
 
There is a tendency towards further clustering in some sectors. For example, in 
1990 sulphur acid production was localised in Moskowskaja oblast (13 per 
cent), Wologodskaja oblast (9 per cent), Saratowskaja oblast (10 per cent), Len-
ingradskaja oblast (12 per cent), and Swerdlowskaja oblast (9 per cent), and 47 
per cent of the entire output was produced in other regions. In 2001, sulphur 
acid production was centered in three regions, namely Wologodskaja oblast (25 
per cent), Saratowskaja oblast (15 per cent), and Moskowskaja oblast (13 per 
cent). Another example is caustic soda. Its production is centered in the Repub-
lic of Bashkortostan (output share increased from 16 to 21 per cent between 
1990 and 2001) and Irkustskaya oblast (with a constant share of 22 per cent), 
while production almost disappeared from Permskaya oblast and Nishe-
gorodskaya oblast. Mineral fertiliser production is increasingly centered in the  
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Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Tatarstan, and Irkustskaya ob-
last/Province. As a consequence, intensified exposure of Russia’s CPS towards 
the world market will affect Russia’s regions asymmetrically. However, accord-
ing to Yudayeva et al. (2003), regional effects of the WTO-accession will re-
main rather insignificant.  
 
It is not surprising that the local agglomeration of major sectors of the Russian 
industry corresponds with a local concentration of foreign investments. Again, 
it is the Centralny Federalny Okrug which leads the ranking of foreign invest-
ment locations with having attracted 48.1 per cent of all foreign investments in 
2002 (GOSKOMSTAT 2003c: 343). It is followed by Sibirsky Federalny Okrug 
(GOSKOMSTAT 2003c: 344), having attracted 14.9 per cent of foreign invest-
ments, mostly in the fuel sector and in non-ferrous metallurgy. Privolshsky 
Federalny Okrug, which is leading in the CPS, has attracted 7.3 per cent. This 
area deserves some more careful consideration as it is one of Russia’s most im-
portant industrialised regions. 
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Table 18. Foreign Investment in Privolshsky Federalny Okrug, years 1995-
2007 
































359 12.0  1332  11.3  1220  8.6  945  3.2  5973  4.9 
Republic of 
Baschkortostsan 
4  0.1 67 0.6 29 0.2 40 0.1 320 0.2 
Republic of 
Tatarstan 
161  5.4 684 5.8 651 5.6 176 0.6 1679 1.4 
Samarskaja 
Oblast 
77  2.6 193 1.6 260 1.8 414 1.4 2367 2.0 
Source: Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Yearbook), GOSKOMS-
TAT, Moscow, 2003, 606; Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Official Statistical Year-
book), GOSKOMSTAT, Moscow, 2004, 621, 622; Rossisky Statistichesky Eshegodnik (Russian Offi-
cial Statistical Yearbook), Rosstat, 2008, 734-735. 
 
Among the regions of Privolshsky Federalny Okrug the Republic of Tatarstan is 
clearly in the focus of foreign investors in the CPS although it was not left un-
troubled by the economic crisis after 1998 as foreign investments almost disap-
peared in 1999. Since 2000, foreign investment volumes are recovering, albeit 
on a rather low level (Jasper, Gumerova & Schaimijeva 2003: 168). 
 
The largest shares of foreign property or mixed Russian-foreign property are to 
be found in the regions Centralny Federalny Okrug (44 per cent of total joint 
ventures), Sewero-Zapadny Federalny Okrug (16 per cent) and Sibirsky Feder-
alny Okrug (11 per cent). These are followed by Privolshsky Federalny Okrug 
with 9 per cent (GOSKOMSTAT 2003, b, 77). In Privolshsky Federalny Okrug 
JVs are concentrated in Permskaja Oblast, Saratovskaja Oblast, and Samarskaja 
Oblast (Oreshkin 2002: 58).  
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4.  Results of a Non-representative Survey 
In order to gain some empirical insights about the current situation of Russia’s 
CPS we carried out a non-representative survey among leading firms of Rus-
sia’s chemical and petrochemical industry. We asked executives about their as-
sessments of Russia’s WTO-accession and its consequences for their compa-
nies. Extensive questionnaires were sent to 17 companies that had been selected 
out of a list of Russia’s 33 leading CPS-firms. Six firms responded. Following 
is a list of the responding firms and their main characteristics. 
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Source: authors’ investigations.  
1 – rank among Russia’s top-200 companies according to turnover,  
2 – rank among Russia’s leading CPS-companies according to turnover, 
3 – according to data from ‘Expert-200’, ‘Expert’ 36/2003,  
./. - information not revealed by the company. 
 
                                                            
16   Open joint stock companies (OJSCs) and closed joint stock companies (CJSCs) differ in the follow-
ing ways: 1) CJSCs are not allowed to issue equity to the public; 2) in CJSCs stock owners have the 
prerogative when new equity is issued; 3) the number of stockholders in CJSCs must not exceed 50; 
4) OSJC’s mimimum equity share capital is determined with 1000 minimum wages, while in an 
CJSC only 100 minimum wages are required; see Kurakow (2004: 42).  
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While, at the time, none of the interviewed companies were undertaking direct 
investments abroad, only one firm intends to engage in foreign direct invest-
ments as a consequence of Russia’s WTO-accession.  
 
With respect to the WTO-entry two different groups of firms become distin-
guishable. While a minority apparently expects an output increase, the majority 
of firms do not expect any changes in their business activities. All companies 
emphasize the necessity of FDI and expect that FDI will increase production 
capacities and efficiency levels by the introduction of recent technologies, the 
replacement of outdated production facilities, energy savings, environmental 
protection, and the development of new flields of activity.  
 
All companies in our sample sell their products in the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS), Europe, and Asia, but opportunities to enlarge their sales 
markets are regarded as problematic by the firms’ executives. It is remarkable 
that for the companies in the sample internationalisation is confined to the sales 
side while almost 100 per cent of input materials are purchased from domestic 
suppliers. 
 
The WTO-accession will increasingly expose Russian firms to international 
performance and quality competition. Here, the actual condition of Russia’s 
CPI-firms appears to be unsatisfactory and may cause concern. Only one of the 
companies in our sample meets international quality standards - besides for 
only a half of its products. Other firms only meet Russian quality standards. 
 
The firms in our sample confirm a high degree of physical attrition of their pro-
duction facilities – more than 70 per cent on average. Roughly 50 per cent of 
the sample firms’ production facilities were produced abroad, which is a result 
of the Soviet Union’s strategy to equip domestic firms with up-to-date technol-
ogy from other countries of the former socialist economic bloc (COMECON). It 
becomes clear that the current capital stock of Russia’s CPS is still on a big 
scale shaped by decisions taken during the pre-transformation era.   
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None of the companies in the sample was at the time of the interviews planning 
the setup of additional production capacities in order to deliver other customers 
but their key accounts. Instead, they predominantly strive for bringing their ac-
tual products to the market a better way while cost-reduction apparently is not a 
first-rank objective. 
 
The firms in our sample rely on technologies they are already familiar with, 
while their dedication to research and technology appears to be moderate (al-
though we again must emphasize that these answers are not necessarily repre-
sentative): Three companies confirmed that they were carrying out R&D-
activities, one answer was negative. According to the information we obtained 
from one firm, only 0.6 per cent of the company’s turnover were invested for 
R&D. None of the firms intended an expansion of its R&D activities after Rus-
sia’s WTO-accession. The introduction of new key technologies was planned 
by four companies for the time after the expected accession, but the point in 
time was not linked with it. 
5.  Conclusions 
We can summarize our observations as follows. 
 
1. Russia’s CPS in general is in a critical state. Its capital stock is in an unsuffi-
cient condition and there are a large number of unprofitable firms.  
 
2. Russia’s CPS cannot be characterised as innovative. Even if new firms are 
beginning to invest in R&D this is hardly reflected in the data so far. Due to in-
sufficient finance and business services sectors, carrying out R&D remains par-
ticularly difficult for Russia’s SMEs. 
 
3. Given a situation of insufficient capital renewal and low utilisation ratios in 
the late 1990s, Russia’s CPS apparently met increasing demand mostly by in-
creasing capacity utilisation. This strategy is currently about to fail because of  
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increasing substitution of domestic products by exports, especially in segments 
of more sophisticated products. 
 
4. (Slowly) rising renewal coefficients, market entries by small and medium 
sized firms and increasing occupation are signs of hope, but recorvery and re-
newal unfold rather slowly. 
 
5. Foreign investors still hesitate to invest in Russia’s CPS. 
 
6. Increasing exposure towards the world markets will affect Russia’s regions 
asymmetrically. 
 
7. Russia’s CPS seems to be an example for the limited information that can be 
derived from aggregated data. While average figures show satisfactory profit-
ability, Russia’s CPS seems to be divided into unprofitable and highly profit-
able but less competitive manufacturers as well as competitively profitable 
firms in the neighbouring areas within the industry. The question is whether ex-
isting high profits are supracompetitive and predominantly stem from anticom-
petitive behaviour or emerge from a situation of otherwise restricted competi-
tion. We cannot verify this with the data at hand but there is some evidence that 
there is still a lack of competitive pressure on many Russian firms and in many 
markets within CPS (Hare 2002; Broadman 2004: 85-87). 
 
With the exact dato of the WTO accession still unknown, it remains an impor-
tant recommendation for Russia to make markets more competitive and im-
prove legal certainty (in particular contract enforceability) for foreign investors. 
More competitive Russian markets seem to be the best recipe for creating and 
fuelling improved international competitiveness of Russian CPS companies. 
Unfortunately, the recently declining ratio of private companies (the so-called 
de-privatization process; see table 9) cast considerable shadows on the actual 
development in this regard. Furthermore, it must be suspected that the existing 
problems for Russian CPS firms with obtaining sufficient investment financial  
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facilities from the lending institutions have been further aggravated by the con-
sequences of the current financial crisis.  
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7.  Appendix 
Table А.  Profitability (profit-cost-price-ratio) of Production, in per cent, 
years 1995-2007
   
    1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2007*
Total  industry  20.1  9.0  12.7 25.5 24.7 18.5 14.4 13.5 18.6 
Fuel  industry  20.8 13.1 15.7 44.5 51.1 35.9 21.2 18.8 30.1 
CPS  6.1  4.3  9.7 22.3  17.0  11.5 8.8 9.0  19.0 
Machine construction and 
metal processing 
10.9  8.0  10.3 17.4 14.1 13.6 11.3 8.7  8.7 
* index including extraction of natural resources, manufacturing industries, energy, gas and water 
production and distribution; 
Source: Rossija w cifrach (Russia in Figures), GOSKOMSTAT, 2004, 180, 191, 194, 195; Rossisky 
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